INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1. Terms of disengagement
· On the one hand UK seem to be seeking tariff-free access to European markets;
· on the other it was not willing to accept the four pillars of single-market membership:
o The free movement of people, shared laws and regulations, and
o Competition policy and a system of common tariffs on trade outside the union.
· On the one hand it sought free trade deals with non-EU countries, such as India; on the other it made plain its intention to prioritize immigration control both for workers and students from those countries, leaving the impression, in the recent words of one member of the House of Lords, “You want our trade but not our children.”
Staying the course
· Britain would not be seeking “unlimited transitional status” but would enter a phased process of implantation following the two-year deadline to reach the agreement. “This will give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new arrangements,
· When it came to membership of the customs union — the system by which EU member states have tariff-free trade between each other, while maintaining common tariffs on non-EU states — Britain did not want to remain a full member, as it prevented it from reaching free trade deals with other non-EU nations.
· However, Britain would seek to maintain a role within it an associate membership, or being a signatory to part of it.
· She hinted at separate deals for sectors of the economy such as automakers and the financial services industry —
The hard road to exit
· Britain had chosen a “hard Brexit”. It would leave the single market and with it gain more control over its borders and its laws, some of which are currently under the oversight of the European Courts of Justice.
· At the same time, the U.K. would seek to negotiate a deal that would give it as much access to the single market without being a part of it.
· It would seek a modified customs union membership to be able to negotiate its own trade treaties with non-EU countries, and build a “truly global Britain”.
· This vision had been built up by Ms. May since the June 2016 referendum, and her speech reiterated it was the alternative, and better, future that awaited Britain.
2. India-Sri Lanka in talks on port
· Sri Lanka is in talks to offer the port of Trincomalee to India, which is one of the best deep sea ports in the world, to India
· By giving Trincomalee to India Sri Lanka wants to maintain a neutral stand and provide equal access to its ports to both China and India.
Hambantota hurdles
· Sri Lanka’s experience with the Chinese, who carried out major infrastructural work at the Hambantota port in southern coast of the island nation, has put a heavy burden on the country,
· The problems and corruption in the project prompted us to review our policy on infrastructural development.
· Sri Lanka is willing to address India’s concerns on the visit of Chinese nuclear submarines to Sri Lanka.
Debt burden
· The port of Hambantota was conceived as a major Sri Lanka-China project during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapakse, but the controversy around the debt burden has slowed down the project.
· Colombo is aware of its responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region, and is committed to freedom of navigation.
· Sri Lanka will remain committed to the fight against terrorism and extremist violence in the region and beyond.
· Sri Lankan’s believe insurgency often receives extra-territorial support, and pointed at the support for the Tamil Tigers from India.
Raisana dialogue
The Raisina Dialogue is an annual conference held in New Delhi, envisioned to be India's flagship conference of geopolitics and geo-economics.
The conference, organized like the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is held jointly by Ministry of External Affairs, India and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), an independent think tank based in India.
Its inaugural session was held from March 1 through 3rd in 2016.
3. To nowhere people next door
· Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, neighbouring Bangladesh, are not recognized by the Myanmar government as an official ethnic group and are therefore denied citizenship. Most Rohingyas are not qualified to be citizens of Myanmar as per the 1982 Citizenship Law, which was promulgated by the erstwhile military junta.
· While it is claimed that there were no Rohingyas in Myanmar before the British brought ‘Bengalis’ to Burma, there is sufficient evidence to show that the Rohingyas pre-existed the British-engineered migration (during the British occupation of the Arakan State in 1823) from present-day Bangladesh to Burma. Even those who arrived in Burma post-1823 could not go back to Bangladesh now given that they have no citizenship claims there. This effectively makes them a stateless people.
· Myanmar denies that its military has committed any wrong. A government-appointed inquiry committee recently concluded that “there were no cases of genocide and religious persecution in the region”.
· What makes the anti-Rohingya violence in Myanmar even more distressing is that all of this is now happening under the stewardship of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her courageous and inspiring “non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights”.
Dilemmas of a Nobel Peace laureate
· Problems with the Myanmar’s constitution:
o The military continues to have a strong hold over the civilian government in Myanmar, especially on key issues such as defence, border affairs and home affairs.
o The country’s constitution also reserves one-fourth of the seats in Parliament for the military.
o Though Ms. Suu Kyi’s party is in power, she herself is barred from becoming the country’s president (she holds the post of State Counsellor) since her children are British citizens.
Under such circumstances, her ability to take on the powerful military establishment remains limited.
· New Delhi’s record of accommodating the Rohingyas is manifestly better than that of Beijing as it has accepted thousands of Rohingyas over the past many years. Yet, this policy may already be undergoing some changes, slowly but steadily. Today, many Rohingyas are either turned away while trying to enter the country or sent to jail for illegal entry.
· India has not signed the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol which require countries to accept refugees.
· The new bill, the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, proposes that Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis and Christians entering India from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan not be considered as “illegal immigrants”. While the proposed amendment is technically ‘pro-minority’, it certainly is anti-Muslim.
Need for imaginative diplomacy
· Although New Delhi’s reluctance to speak out publicly about the violations against the Rohingyas is understandable, it can ill afford to ignore the crisis in Myanmar. Even if human rights considerations are the least of New Delhi’s worries, it is clearly in its interest to ensure that stability and peace return to the Rakhine state.
o For one, as and when peace returns to Myanmar, India can ask the latter to rehabilitate the Rohingyas (like it did vis-à-vis East Pakistan refugees after the 1971 war).
o Second, a stable and democratic Myanmar will naturally gravitate towards New Delhi. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Rohingya crisis, if it remains unsettled, can become a path toward radicalisation and pose a greater security threat for India.
o There are reports of increasing radicalisation among sections of the Rohingya community.
· New Delhi should use creative diplomacy to persuade Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya crisis. It should perhaps consider appointing a special envoy for this purpose who should hold discreet negotiations with Myanmar’s military, Ms. Suu Kyi, Dhaka and Beijing in order to bring an end to the crisis.
